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RECENT CASES
prove to be very significant in the field of criminal law. The question
is: If it is a violation of due process to deny a witness the privilege
against self-incrimination, to force him to testify if his testimony
can be used by another jurisdiction, and to allow another jurisdiction
to use the testimony once it has been forced under an immunity
statute, is it not equally a violation of due process to allow one
jurisdiction to prosecute a defendant for a criminal act for which
he has already been acquitted or convicted in another jurisdiction?
The reason given for allowing both state and federal governments
to prosecute the same defendant for the same criminal act is that
the governments are separate sovereignties, and therefore there has
been a crime committed against both.23  It should be patently
obvious that this is a mere fiction derived from a legal concept that
has ceased to be significant in American constitutional law.
24 If
the Court has abolished the dual sovereignty fiction in the area
of self-incrimination should it not also abolish it in the area of double
jeopardy? The dual crime argument might have logical force in the
case of a continuing crime between two states, but it has, by the
Murphy case, lost what strength it once had with reference to acts
which violate both state and federal law.
25
The Murphy case represents the Court's increased willingness
to expand on the concept of due process of law. Considering this
tendency it is not highly speculative to predict that in the near
future the law will see many new developments in this area. Because
of the many problems arising with each new opinion, one cannot
help but ask if perhaps the Court is not moving too fast. This is
not to say that the decisions themselves have been wrong but it is
to suggest that society needs time to adjust to new constitutional
standards just as it needs time to adjust to new legislation. In the
last analysis the results of both are the same.
LYNN E. CROOKS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS-JURY DETERMINATION OF
VOLUNTARINESS OF CONFESSION-C o n v i c t e d of first degree
murder, the defendant petitioned for habeas corpus in federal court
asserting that his conviction in New York was invalid as founded
upon a confession improperly determined voluntary. During trial
23. United States v. Lanza, 260- U.S. 377 (1922) ; accord, Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S.
121 (1959); Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959).
24. The concept of federalism espoused by Mr. Justice Harlan in his dissenting opinions
in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 496 (1957); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 672
(1961) and more recently in Malloy v. Hogan, 84 Sup. Ct. 1489, 1497 (1964), has been
consistently rejected by the Court.
25. See Bartkus v. Illinois, supra note 23, at 150 (Black J., dissenting); Abbate v.
United States, supra note 23, at 201 (Black J., dissenting),
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there was conflicting testimony as to the voluntariness of the con-
fession. In accordance with New York law, this question was sub-
mitted to the jury along with the other issues for a single verdict,
with the instruction to disregard the confession if voluntary and to
determine the issue of guilt from other evidence, or, if it found the
confession voluntary, to determine its reliability and afford it weight
accordingly. The United States Supreme Court held, because a jury
cannot without confusion determine both issues of guilt and volun-
tariness, and because its decision as to voluntariness is not discern-
ible by an appellate court, this procedure did not afford a reliable
determination of coercion and thereby violated the due process
clause. The four dissenting Justices reasoned that a jury determi-
nation is a safeguard of a defendant's liberty and that the majority
decision was grounded in conjecture. Jackson v. Denno, 84 Sup.
Ct. 1774 (1964).
The differing jurisdictions have developed three methods of de-
termining a confession's voluntariness. First is the orthodox view
under which the judge hears evidence and alone rules on voluntarines
for the purpose of admissibility; the jury only determines voluntari-
ness as affecting the confession's credibility.' Second is the
approach of Massachusetts wherein the judge at a preliminary
inquiry is permitted to weigh the evidence and exclude a confession
if he finds it involuntary, or, if he finds it voluntary, to submit it to
the jury with the instruction that they must find it voluntary before
considering it.2 Third is the New York view,3 which was involved
in the principal case.
The difference in these views is that under the orthodox rule the
judge's determination of coercion is final 4 while under the latter
two rules the judge's determination is not, unless he finds the con-
fession involuntary. The Massachusetts rule gives the judge greater
discretion than the New York formula in that he may exclude a
confession even if there is a fair question of fact.
The issues of competency and credibility are related. The ortho-
dox method follows the traditional division of responsibility between
judge and jury: 5 that the determination of the question of voluntari-
ness is one of competency for the judge, while the jury's duty is
to weigh the credibility of evidence.e Under the heterodox
methods a judge's finding of competency is not conclusive, as it
1. Phillips v. State, 258 Ala. 510, 28 So. 2d 542 (1947) ; State v. English, 85 N.W.2d
427 (N.D. 1957). This rule is followed in twenty states and three federal circuit courts.
2. State v. Pulliam, 87 Ariz. 216, 349 P.2d 781 (1960) ; Commonwealth v. Sheppard.
313 Mass. 590, 48 N.E.2d 630 (1943). This rule is followed in fourteen states and two
federal circuit courts.
3. State v. Jones, 253 Iowa 829, 113 N.W.2d 303 (1962). This view is followed in
sixteen states and six federal circuit courts.
4. Jackson v. Commonwealth, 193 Va. 664, 70 S.:E.2d 322 (1952).
5. 9 WIMoP , EVIDENCE § 2550 (3d ed. 1940).
6. Burton v. State, 107 Ala. 108, 18 So. 284 (1891).
7. 9 WIGMORE, EvroENcE § 2550 (3d ed. 1940). T.his was a term used by Wigmore
to characterize the Massachusetts and New York ruleas.
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may also be for the jury to decide whether the confession was freely
made,8 thus giving the jury the duty of resolving both competency
and credibility. In rejecting a coerced statement, the jury uses the
same judicial standard as the judge.9
The advocates of the orthodox rule attack the heterodox rules
on two main grounds: first, it is claimed that a jury is unable to
differentiate between the issue of voluntariness and the ultimate
issue of guilt, and that even if the jury found the confession involun-
tary it could not disregard it;10 second, it is argued that if the
judge's role is not made final he may shirk his responsibility and
surrender in favor of a jury decision," resulting in a diminution
of the protection afforded the defendant.
The advocates of the heterodox methods answer these allegations
by claiming that a jury would not retire confused if properly in-
structed, 12 and that the prospect is equally great of finding a shirker
on the bench under either rule.1" Finally, the defendant is protected
by placing the burden of proving voluntariness on the prosecution.
14
The principal case overrules the Court's recent determination of
the procedure employed to resolve the questions of fact relating to
the voluntariness issue, 5 and impliedly accepts the Massachusetts
view, which gives the defendant the added protection of a second
chance to have his confession excluded, 8 thereby forcing twenty two
jurisdictions to seek a different rule.1
7
It appears that the decision is desirable insofar as it is a move
for uniformity, but it is arguable that the Court's reasoning was
imperfect. Since there is no demonstrable proof that separating the
issue of voluntariness of a confession from the issue of the accused's
guilt is so difficult as to be impossible for a jury to deal with fairly
(a point relied on by the dissenters), the Court's basis for its decision
-that the jury is incapable of giving a reliable and clear cut decision
of coercion and guilt-is not persuasive. Also, to strengthen its posi-
tion, the Court should have made clear why the Massachusetts rule
would not offend due process, since its effect is, in many cases, the
same as that of the New York method. This could have been accom-
8. State v. Johnson, 69 Ariz. 203, 211 P.2d 469 (1949).
9. 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 861 (3d ed. 1940).
10. This is the argument used by the majority in the principal case.
11. Meltzer, Involuntary Confessions: The Allocation of Responsibility Between Judge
and Jury, 21 U. CHI. L. REV. 317, 329 (1954).
12. See State v. Smith, 32 N.J. 501, 161 A.2d 520 (1960). An example of such in-
structions appear in State v. Hood, 69 Ariz. 294, 213 P.2d 368, 371-72 (1950) : "The law
absolutely forbids you to consider a confession in determining the innocence or guilt of
a defendant unless the confession was voluntarily made, and although the Court has
admitted evidence tending to show that defendant made a confession, you must disregard
the asserted confession entirely unless you' yourselves, by your own weighing of all the
evidence, your own judging of the credibility of the witnesses and your own reasonable
deductions, conclude that the alleged confession was not only made but was voluntary."
13. State v. Smith, supra note 12, at 551-52.
14. State v. Pulliam, 87 Ariz. 216, 349 P.2d 781 (1960).
15. Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953), which held that the fourteenth amend-
ment does not forbid Jury trial of the issue, was specifically overruled.
16. Commonwealth v. Preece, 140 Mass. 276, 5 N.E. 494 (1885).
17. See State v. Jones, 253 Iowa 829, 113 N.W.2d 303 (1962).
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plished by reference to the traditional competency-credibility dicoto-
my, since that is the focal point of the problem.
The author concludes that in order to justify the existence of the
Massachusetts view over the New York procedure, more reasoning
is necessary than an attack on the jury determination of a factual
issue.
JEROME JAYNES
OFFICERS-ELIGIBILITY AND QUALIFICATION-LEGISLATOR CREATING
OFFICE OR INCREASING EMOLUMENTS-In an original proceeding
to determine the right of three candidates to run for the offices of
governor and secretary of state, where each candidate had been a
member of the previous legislature, which had passed a small across-
the-board salary increase for all state offices, the Utah Supreme
Court held, one judge dissenting, that the Utah constitutional pro-
vision' forbidding any legislator during his term of office to seek
any civil office which had been created, or for which the emoluments
had been increased during his term of office, was not violated by
the legislature's general "cost-of-living" salary increase, 2 and that
the legislators were eligible to hold such state offices. The chief
justice dissented on the grounds that the constitutional provision
was clear and unambiguous, and that the majority, by judicial fiat,
had expanded the intent of the constitution. Shields v. Toronto, 395
P.2d 829 (Utah 1964).
More than half the states,3 following the example of the federal
constitution, 4 have enacted constitutional provisions similar to the
Utah provision interpreted above. These jurisdictions have generally
construed such provisions strictly and have barred legislators from
running for offices created during their term of office, such as
special legal counsel, 5 justice of the peace,6 industrial commis-
sion,7 war emergency council,8 levee commissioner,9 city police
judge,10 and circuit judge." Courts have also barred legislators
when the emoluments were increased for such offices as county
1. UTAH CosT. art. VI, § 7.
2. The salary of the secretary of state was raised from $10,500 to $11,000, and the
governor's Was raised from $13,200 to $15,000.
3. E.g., FLA. CONST. art 3, § 5; MINN. CONsT. art. 4, § 9; N.D. CONST. art. 2, § 39;
S.D. CONST. art. 3, § 12; UTAH CONST. art. 6, § 7.
4. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 6, cl. 2.
5. Palmer v. State, 11 S.D. 78, 75 N.W. 818 (1898) ; but of. State ex. rel. Landis v.
Futch, 122 Fla. 837, 165 So. 907 (1936).
6. Kimble v. Bender, 173 Md. 608, 196 Atl. 409 (1938).
7. State ex. rel. Jugler v. Grover, 102 Utah 41, 125 P.2d 807 (1942) ; but cf. Shields
v. Toronto, 395 P.2d 829 (Utah 1964).
8. Opinion of the Justices, 244 Ala. 386, 13 So. 2d 674 (1943).
9. Shelby v. Alcorn, 36 Miss. 273, 72 Am. Dec. 169 (1858).
10. Montgomery v. State ex rel. Enslen, 107 Ala. 372, 18 So. 157 (1895).
11. State v. Porter, 1 Ala. 688 (1840).
